Why the pen is mightier than the sword
When words ended the Cold War
Throughout history, there have been many cases of poor communication leading to significant consequences, whether it was starting a war, bloody outcomes of battles, or even gaffs and faux pas made by politicians and leaders. However, few events can compare with the comedy of errors that led to the unintended fall of the Berlin Wall and the ending of the Cold War. History can certainly teach us a lesson or two on the importance of clear lines of communication, not just in global affairs, but in business and commerce.
It’s not over until the butterfly flaps its wings - According to some mathematicians and physicists, we exist in a chaotic universe, where events largely occur in a random state of disorder with irregular tendencies. However, according to chaos theory, there are underlying patterns, feedback loops, and interconnectedness, which reflect the causal nature of our universe, no matter how far apart or random events may appear. The ‘butterfly effect’, an underlying principle of the theory, describes how a small change or a seemingly inconsequential event can result in catastrophic consequences – the proverbial metaphor is usually a butterfly flapping its wings on one side of the world, leading to a hurricane on the other side of the planet.
It appears such is the case with the fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989, leading to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and (thankfully) a relatively peaceful end to the Cold War. The events leading up to that point appear to have been a combination of bureaucratic farce, errors in judgement, miscommunication, and an East German politician with an alleged drinking problem – the butterfly had well and truly flapped its wings.
A comedy of errors - It could be argued that the first domino to fall in this chain of events was the ‘Pan-European Picnic’ held earlier that year in August 1989. This was a peaceful demonstration held at the Austrian-Hungarian border near Sopron, Hungary, which eventually led to the opening of the border crossing, and the first real test of Mikhail Gorbachev’s wider ‘Glasnost and Perestroika’ policy of political reform in the USSR and its relationship with the communist bloc. Once news broke, tens of thousands of East Germans headed off to Hungary via the then Czechoslovakia, with the hope of escaping to the West. By late October 1989, the number of people on the move grew so large that neither Czechoslovakia nor Hungary could deal with the masses.
Meanwhile, in East Germany, the long serving leader of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Erich Honecker, was forced to resign by some members of the Politburo in October 1989, due to his increasingly poor health, and hand over reins of power to Egon Krenz. Although Krenz was promising political reform and greater personal freedoms, as well as to reopen the border with Czechoslovakia (which had been sealed to prevent East Germans from fleeing to West Germany), few people actually believed the sincerity of the new leader, and public opposition and protests grew against the new regime.
In October 1989, Krenz had requested Gerhard Lauter, a relatively young and inexperienced bureaucrat, to draft a new travel policy. Lauter was a former People’s Police officer, and had recently been promoted in the Interior Ministry to the head of the department responsible for issuing passports and the registration of citizens. Lauter was asked to create a minor loophole in the rules, allowing disgruntled citizens to permanently leave East Germany, thus removing potential political troublemakers for the state.
On 6 November, in an attempt to placate the public and demonstrate the government’s intent at political reform, the Interior Ministry published a draft of the new travel regulations. However, these changes seemed little different to the rules under the Honecker government, with an opaque and vague travel approval process, and somewhat contradictory and oftentimes difficult to decipher text. This only further enraged the public, with demonstrations and public unrest growing in intensity. The unrest was being felt by the Krenz-led government, and on 7 November 1989, he had to accept the resignation of Prime Minister Willi Stoph and around two-thirds of the Politburo. Despite this, Krenz precariously clung on to power and was unanimously re-elected as General Secretary by the Central Committee.
On the same day, at a meeting on 7 November, the Politburo decided to immediately put into force a portion of the draft travel regulations pertaining to permanent emigration, in what appeared to be a knee-jerk reaction to the public unrest. The Politburo had initially planned to construct a new border crossing near Schirnding specifically for this purpose. However, the Stasi and the Interior Ministry, charged with drafting the new text, concluded that this was not feasible, and resorted to redrafting the text associated with emigration and temporary travel. The redrafted text now stipulated that East German citizens could apply for permission to travel abroad without having to meet the previous travel requirements.
On 9 November 1989, the Politburo, led by Krenz, decided that people who were allowed to leave could do so directly through border crossing points between East and West Germany, including between East and West Berlin. Later during that same day, Lauter and other ministerial bureaucrats modified the text to include private, round-trip, travel. It was decided that the new regulations were to take effect the next day.
The draft text of the new travel regulations is shown below.
“To change the situation with regard to the permanent exit of East German citizens to West Germany via CSSR, it has been determined that:
1. The decree from 30 November 1988 about travel abroad of East German citizens will no longer be applied until the new travel law comes into force.
2. Starting immediately, the following temporary transition regulations for travel abroad and permanent exits from East Germany are in effect:
a) Applications by private individuals for travel abroad can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorisations will be issued within a short period of time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particularly exceptional cases.
b) The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People's Police district offices in East Germany are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit. It is still possible to apply for permanent exit in the departments for internal affairs [of the local district or city councils].
c) Permanent exits are possible via all East German border crossings to West Germany and (West) Berlin.
d) The temporary practice of issuing (travel) authorisations through East German consulates and permanent exit with only an East German personal identity card via third countries ceases.
3. The attached press release explaining the temporary transition regulation will be issued on 10 November.”
Up until this point, these events may have been seen as relatively benign, with the bureaucratic machinery and tight grip of the Stasi security apparatus simply going through the motions of instituting change, when all the while it was simply an exercise to secure technocratic legitimacy.
However, the next event was to prove to be the most fateful.
Meet Günter Schabowski, the SED party leader in East Berlin and the top government spokesman.
Source: The German Federal Archive.
Schabowski (born 4 January 1929) studied journalism at the Karl Marx University, Leipzig, before becoming a member of the SED in 1952. In 1978, Schabowski became the chief editor of the Neues Deutschland (New Germany) newspaper, the official mouthpiece of the SED. In 1981, he joined the SED Central Committee, and in 1985, after leaving his post at Neues Deutschland, he became the First Secretary of the East Berlin chapter of the SED and a member of the Politburo. He also served as member of the Volkskammer (the legislature of East Germany) from 1981 to 1990.
In October 1989, Schabowski was part of the group of Politburo members who forced Honecker to resign in favour of Krenz. As part of the new regime’s attempts at improving its public image, Krenz appointed Schabowski as the government’s unofficial spokesman, probably because Schabowski had been in charge of media affairs for the Politburo. In addition, he was reportedly named as the second in charge in the SED, Krenz’s previous role.
Western journalists were familiar with Schabowski, as he often held daily press conferences to regurgitate the party line, announce any changes, and respond to journalist questions about the prevailing political conditions with party-approved policy responses. Most of the Western journalists would find these often hour-long press conferences tedious, with little in the way of any improvised responses to their questions.
On 9 November 1989, Schabowski was due to hold his regular press conference at 18:00 CET, which was to be broadcast live on East German TV and radio. Schabowski was to be joined by Minister of Foreign Trade, Gerhard Beil, and Central Committee members, Helga Labs and Manfred Banaschak.
Just before the press conference, Krenz handed Schabowski a press release, summarising the new draft travel regulations. The press release was supposed to have been embargoed until the following morning, when the new travel rules were meant to have come into force. It’s important to note that, despite his senior position, Schabowski had not been privy to the proposed new travel rules, and he was not present at the Politburo meetings a few days earlier when Krenz and other members had debated and decided upon the new rules. Up until he was handed the press release, he was completely unaware of the imminent changes. However, Schabowski apparently didn’t read the text of the press release, but simply folded the note and placed it in his jacket pocket.
The text of the press release is shown below.
“Responsible: Government spokesman of East Germany; Council of Ministers
Berlin (ADN)
As the Press Office of the Ministry of the Interior has announced, the East German Council of Ministers has decided that the following temporary transition regulation for travel abroad and permanent exit from East Germany will be effective until a corresponding law is put into effect by the Volkskammer:
1) Applications by private individuals for travel abroad can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorisations will be issued within a short period of time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particularly exceptional cases.
2) The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People's Police district offices in East Germany are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit. It is still possible to apply for permanent exit in the departments for internal affairs [of the local district or city councils].
3) Permanent exits are possible via all East German border crossings to West Germany and (West) Berlin.
4) This decision revokes the temporary practice of issuing (travel) authorisations through East German consulates and permanent exit with only an East German personal identity card via third countries ceases.”
Whether Schabowski was instructed what to do with the press release remains unclear. However, there was one minor issue – Schabowski allegedly had a drinking problem, and that evening, he stumbled onto the stage to begin his regular press conference.
During the press conference, Schabowski droned on for almost an hour, and appeared either sleep-deprived or hungover (possibly both). He oftentimes mumbled incoherent responses to questions from journalists. NBC’s Tom Brokaw, who was present, noted afterwards that he was “bored” during most of the press conference. However, things were about to rapidly change, and the “boring” press conference up to that point, as well as Schabowski, was about to go down as one of the most momentous events in history.
Just before the press conference was about to wrap-up, an Italian journalist, ANSA’s Riccardo Ehrman, asked whether the draft travel rules issued on 6 November were a mistake by the Krenz administration. Schabowski initially gave an incoherent response, suggesting that West Germany had exhausted its ability to accept fleeing East Germans. He then suddenly remembered the press release he had been handed, and stated that a new law had been drafted to allow permanent emigration at any border crossing. This immediately electrified the audience of journalists and a barrage of questions was then thrown at Schabowski.
Schabowski was taken aback by the reaction of the journalists, as he assumed that the reporters were aware of the new rules. He then decided to take the folded press release out of his pocket and read out the text, live on air, to further gasps from the audience. After he had finished, Ehrman pressed his inquiry by asking when the new rules were to come into force. After some hesitation and confusion, and looking down at the note in his hands, Schabowski replied “As far as I know…it takes effect immediately…without delay”, apparently due to an assumption based on the press release’s opening paragraph.
The Minister of Foreign Trade, Gerhard Beil, who at this point was shell-shocked as to what had just happened, tried to interject and stated that it was up to the Council of Ministers to decide when the new rules took effect. However, Schabowski desperately continued to re-read the press release, over Beil’s protestations, and in particular the clause that stated the rules were in effect until a law on the matter was passed by the Volkskammer.
At this point, a journalist then asked a crucial question on whether the new regulation was to be applied to the crossings between East and West Berlin. Schabowski paused for what seemed like an eternity, then shrugged and re-read item 3 in the press release, which stated that it did.
Further inflaming the curiosity of the stunned journalists, Daniel Johnson of The Daily Telegraph asked what this meant for the future of the Berlin Wall. Schabowski sat frozen in his chair, perhaps suddenly becoming sober at the realisation of what had just transpired, and what this meant. He eventually mustered a rambling reply about how the issue of the Berlin Wall was associated with the broader problem of disarmament.
After this fiasco, Schabowski promptly ended the press conference at 19:00 CET as journalists rushed to report what had just happened to their newswires, TV, and radio networks.
The news spread like wildfire. Excerpts from the press conference were broadcast on West Germany’s two main news programs that night, one at 19:17 CET on ZDF’s heute, which came on air as the press conference was ending, and later that evening at 20:00 CET on ARD’s Tagesschau. Both ARD and ZDF had been allowed to broadcast to East Germany since the 1950s, and were far more popular amongst East Germans than their own TV channels. By the late evening, most East Germans were aware of the developments, and thousands of people had proceeded to the border crossings along the Berlin Wall. Live television was reporting on the events, which only urged more people to gather at the gates.
The border guards and Stasi officials at the gates were completely flummoxed, caught unaware of the change in travel rules, as they tried to comprehend the news from the press conference earlier that evening. At the Bornholmer Straße border crossing in East Berlin, Harald Jäger had been a Stasi guard since 1964, and earlier that evening had watched Schabowski on television. Dumbfounded by the remarks, he told his fellow guards that the official’s words were “deranged”. However, his superiors assured him that travel remained blocked.
Before long, Jäger and his guards were overwhelmed by thousands of people, and they were now concerned for the own safety. The same scene was occurring at other checkpoints along the divide between East and West Berlin. Despite desperate calls higher up the chain of command, there were no firm orders or directives given to the border guards, and it appeared that no one amongst the East German authorities was willing to order the use of deadly force.
At around 21:00 CET, Jäger and his guards decided to allow a small flow of people across, mostly as an attempt to placate the crowd and ease the numbers. They managed to do this for a couple of hours, but the crowd only grew further in size, chanting “Open the gate, open the gate!” and “Schabowski said we can cross”. Finally, at 23:30 CET that night, Jäger decided enough was enough and ordered the gates to be opened, allowing thousands of jubilant East Germans to cross into West Berlin.
The rest, as they say, is history.
Long after the events of that evening, Schabowski had reportedly said that
“All one needed to do to conduct a press conference was to be able to speak German and read text without mistakes”.
Clearly, this had eluded Schabowski that evening, whether due to the alleged influence of exuberant consumption of alcohol or misinterpretation of a piece of text...or both.